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Abstract
Background: Multi-resistant bacteria pose an increasing and significant public health risk. As awareness of the
severity of the problem grows, it is likely that it will become the target for a range of public health interventions.
Some of these can intentionally or unintentionally lead to stigmatization of groups of citizens.
Discussion: The article describes the phenomenon of stigmatization within the health care area by discussing
the concept in relation to AIDS and psychiatric diagnosis. It unfolds the ethical aspects of using stigmatization
as a public health instrument to affect unwanted behaviours e.g. smoking. Moreover it discusses stigmatization
as an unintended albeit expected side effect of public health instruments potentially used to counter the
challenge of multi-resistant bacteria with particular reference to the Danish case of the growing problems with
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) within pig production.
Summary: We argue that using stigmatization as a direct means to achieve public health outcomes is almost
always ethically illegitimate. Autonomy and dignity considerations count against it, and the cost-benefit analysis
that might by some be taken to outweigh these considerations will be fundamentally uncertain. We further
argue that interventions where stigmatization is a side-effect need to fulfil requirements of proportionality, and
that they may fall prey to ‘the stigmatization dilemma’, i.e. the dilemma that arises when all policy options are
potentially stigmatizing but stigmatize different groups. When this dilemma obtains the decision-maker should
choose the intervention that does not lead to permanent stigmatization and that stigmatizes as few as possible,
as briefly as possible, and as little as possible.
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Background
Introduction
Multi-resistant bacteria pose an increasing challenge to
public health. In this article we consider the ethical aspects
of adopting public health instruments to counter the chal-
lenge of multi-resistance that lead to stigmatization; in
particular we focus on Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) in
the Danish public health sector.
Defining stigmatization
What is stigmatization? The locus classicus is Erving
Goffman’s characterisation of stigmatization. In his inter-
pretation, stigmatization involves the act of attributing a
person with a discreditable trait that makes the person
seem inferior or dangerous–ultimately something less
than human–in light of an underlying ideology [1].
The ‘virtual’, social identity formed by these attributes
is then subjected to various forms of discrimination
resulting in the person being cut off from society [1].
Building on Goffman, a recent analysis suggests that
stigmatization has five elements [2]: First, the social
identification of a difference between persons and the
labelling of this difference; Second, the linking of dif-
ferences with negative stereotypes, i.e. linking a person
to what is consciously or pre-consciously associated
with undesirable characteristics; Third, the segregation
of the labelled person from the labelling person, i.e. a
separation of individuals into “us” and “them”; Fourth,
the loss of social status and discrimination, and: Fifth, the
asymmetrical distribution of power. From this perspective
stigmatization therefore involves and requires power. If
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the labelling and stereotyping is to result in segregation
and a more general loss of status, but also in more general
discrimination, the labelling party must be in a position
of social, economic, and political power that allows for
stigmatization to happen.
All these elements can be found in historical examples
of intentional stigmatization, for instance in the Nazi
stigmatization of the Jewish people etc.
Note that, according to this account, stigmatization
requires the presence of all of these elements, but also
allows for each of the elements to vary in intensity,
and thus for stigmatization and its effects to vary in
degree. Note also that this account of stigmatization
allows people to escape stigmatization in certain cir-
cumstances. If a stigmatized difference is not an essential
characteristic of a person but only a contingent character-
istic, then he or she may move out of the stigmatized
group in so far as this characteristic changes. A stigma-
tized smoker may, for instance, move out of this stigma-
tized group and loose the stigma by giving up smoking.
Stigmatization can be both intentional and uninten-
tional; also it may be the result of various kinds of
actions, but always results in labelling, negative stereo-
typing, separation, loss of status and discrimination on
the basis of asymmetry in power between the stigma-
tized and the stigmatizing party.
In the public health context the concept of stigmatization
as a potential public health instrument overlaps with
other concepts such as ‘denormalization’ and ‘social ac-
ceptability’ [3, 4]. From a conceptual point of view the
act of ‘denormalizing’ or decreasing the ‘social accept-
ability’ of certain a behaviour does not necessarily lead
to stigmatization of persons. However, in practice it
seems likely that stigmatization–as defined above–can
be the result whether this is intended or not. Neither
‘denormalizing’ nor decreasing ‘social acceptability’ ne-
cessarily involves asymmetric distributions of power
but when pursued by public health authorities backed
by the state, they most often do.
Effects of stigmatization–theory and evidence
A key to considering stigmatizing instruments in the
public arsenal of preventive measures is the question of
the effects of stigmatization. Two questions are espe-
cially pertinent. On the one hand: “Is stigmatization ef-
fective in changing behaviour?” On the other hand: “Does
stigmatizationhave effects thatmaybe consideredharmful to
theindividual?”
With regard to the first question, studies suggest
that the stigmatization of smokers may indeed change
smoking behavior. One study shows a correlation be-
tween what the authors call the “smoking climate”,
understood as the social attitude expressed in the
public sphere towards smoking, and the number of
smokers [5]. More importantly, this study finds that
the willingness to quit smoking is affected by experi-
ences of “unfavourable public sentiment”. Another US
study supports this conclusion by showing that the
percentage of smokers in a given population depends,
among other factors, on the social acceptability of
smoking [6]. Both studies conclude that an increase in
stigmatization or social unacceptability of smoking
would be effective in decreasing smoking rates. A
third cohort study of smoking cessation shows that
smokers who perceive strong anti-smoking norms are
more likely to try to quit smoking and are more likely
to succeed in quitting [7]. On the other hand, the
literature also indicates that stigmatization of obese
individuals may not motivate them to change their eat-
ing or physical activity [8]. For the present purposes it is
sufficient that stigmatization thus sometimes are effective
in changing behaviour. If so, it is possible for public health
authorities to consider employing stigmatization as
public health tool in circumstances where it is likely to
be effective.
In the literature there have been explicit calls for
employing stigmatization as a deliberate public health
instrument in relation to smoking and obesity [9, 10].
This shows that at least some authors must believe that
intentional stigmatization in these contexts will be
effective.
With regard to the second question, it seems obvious
that it is harmful for the stigmatised, if stigmatization
leads to significant loss of social status, negative dis-
crimination etc. However, there is conflicting evidence
in the literature in regard to the psychological effects
on the individual. In a paper reviewing more than
20 years of research, it is concluded that prejudice
against members of stigmatized groups cannot in gen-
eral be demonstrated to cause lowered self-esteem
among the members of these groups [11]. This conclu-
sion is contradicted by a more recent study showing
that stigmatization associated with psychiatric condi-
tions has an influence on the self-esteem of many of
the persons suffering from these diseases [12]. Several
studies concerning the effects of the AIDS stigma indi-
cate that the fear of stigmatization, in combination
with experiences of being stigmatized, affect people
with HIV in their choices of seeking assistance for
various physical, psychological, and social needs. An-
other study, along the same lines, shows that the feel-
ing of being stigmatized among individuals with HIV/
AIDS is correlated with anxiety, depression, and dis-
trust in others. Individuals who do not feel stigmatized
do not suffer from anxiety, depression, or distrust in
others [13]. A more recent review of the social psych-
ology of stigma also finds that the evidence relating to
the effect of stigma on self-esteem is complicated, and
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that the effect found varies both between studies of the
same kind of stigma, between different kinds of stig-
matized characteristics, and between different kinds of
coping strategies [14]. The review suggests that some
coping strategies that protect self-esteem may have
negative effects in other important areas of life such as
academic achievement and health. In conclusion, al-
though there is somewhat conflicting evidence on the
effects of stigmatization on self-esteem, there are good
reasons to assume the existence of connections be-
tween stigmatization and/or perceived stigmatization
and self-stigmatization and psychological harm.
Discussion
The ethics of stigmatization and public health
intervention–three perspectives
There are many aspects of the question of ethical
legitimacy concerning stigmatizing interventions to
promote public health. However, three main perspec-
tives have been developed and discussed in the litera-
ture. They relate to: 1) The utility that may be gained
from such interventions [9]; 2) the violation of personal
autonomy and rights [15]; and 3) the violation of hu-
man dignity that is involved in using stigmatizing inter-
ventions to promote public health [16, 17].
 Utility-perspective:
Stigmatization of a person or a group is legitimate if
and only if it is a necessary part of an intervention
that maximises or Pareto-optimises the public
health outcome given the costs associated with
stigmatization.
The utility-perspective on stigmatization rests on a
number of crucial assumptions that must be analysed
from case to case. Firstly, that the benefits and costs of
stigmatization can be known and compared. Given the
range of negative effects of stigmatization, the possibility
of individual differences in the response to stigmatization,
and not least that the means of stigmatization, may
vary in the severity and duration in which they expose
an individual to stigmatization, this seems a particu-
larly questionable assumption. Secondly, that the bene-
fits and costs of the intervention can be estimated
when the issue of stigmatization is bracketed. Thirdly,
that there are no alternative and less stigmatizing ways
of obtaining the same benefits in public health. Note,
finally, that the utility-perspective may be given two
interpretations depending on whether maximization or
optimization of public health is chosen as the outcome
criterion. Maximization requires that the overall gain
in public health is greater than for any alternative
intervention. Optimization requires that the overall
gain in public health is greater than for any alternative
intervention and that no person is made worse off.
Optimization is the stricter criterion in relation to
stigmatization, because it implies that a stigmatized per-
son also should obtain significant gains in health in order
to counterbalance the costs of suffering stigmatization.
 Autonomy-perspective:
Using stigmatizing interventions for public health
purposes rests on state-sanctioned paternalism, i.e.
the view that it is legitimate for the state to influence
the choices of individual citizens with the aim of
benefitting them. Protection of personal autonomy
implies that state-sanctioned paternalism is
illegitimate. More specifically, we shall say that the
autonomy-perspective implies that the individual’s
right to pursue his or her own goals without
undue influence must take priority in issues
regarding public health policies to the widest
possible extent, and in particular where the public
health intervention will subject an individual to
harm or risk of harm.
It has been argued that the use of stigmatizing inter-
ventions to promote public health is in line with exist-
ing forms of state-sanctioned paternalism used in the
public health sector such as prohibitions against inject-
ing very dangerous drugs etc. [18]. However, although
prohibition clearly is a form of state-sanctioned pater-
nalism, there is a crucial ethical difference between
such examples and the use of stigmatizing interven-
tions. Stigmatization is–contrary to prohibition–known
to cause significant risk of harm to the individual in the
form of discrimination, negative psychological effects,
and may even affect physical wellbeing by affecting the
motivation to seek medical assistance. From a perspec-
tive focusing on the autonomy of the citizen, it seems a
plausible position that state-sanctioned, paternalistic,
public health interventions are justified only to the
extent that they do not cause harm to the individual.
Any decision to subject an individual to interventions
aimed at improving health but known to cause harm or
risk of harm, must be taken by the individual.
 Dignity-perspective:
Stigmatization operates by dehumanizing
individuals. Treating others as human beings is an
expression of a basic respect for individuals [16].
Stigmatization is therefore ethically illegitimate,
and renders interventions that create
stigmatization ethically illegitimate.
The dignity perspective points to the degrading and
humiliating character of stigmatization. Stigmatization
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operates in part by pointing to the undesirability of
certain aspects of the other person-aspects that are seen
as deviant and/or shameful. Going back to Goffman, it is
not only certain actions, but even the person herself
that is being found less worthy than those not being
associated with the perceived negative aspects. Such
stigmatization violates the fundamental value that all
people are of equal and infinite worth. In this perspec-
tive the alleged fact that stigmatization may be a recur-
ring phenomenon in society cannot justify the proactive
use of stigmatization by the state.
The three basic perspectives are in tension with one
another, and a choice to use stigmatizing measures to
promote public health must balance these values and
address underlying assumptions. The principle of pro-
portionality and the precautionary principle are of
relevance for this process. The principle of proportion-
ality requires that there is a reasonable proportionality
between the measures used and their outcome [19]. In
our case this amounts to a requirement of reasonable pro-
portionality between the people affected by stigmatization
and the health benefits achieved by the stigmatizing
intervention. Let us first consider interventions that
primarily work through stigmatization. Given the un-
certainty about the effectiveness of stigmatization as an
instrument of public health, but also the character,
extent, and likelihood of negative effects on individuals,
any attempt to secure proportionality between the
intervention and its effects are questionable, because of
the problems in estimating benefits and costs. This
clearly lays the ground for the precautionary principle.
Although strongly contested with regard to its validity
as a decision-making principle for public policy deci-
sion, the precautionary principle requires that precau-
tion is exercised where there is uncertainty about the
possibility, size, and probability of potential negative
effects of a given intervention [20, 21]. The precaution-
ary principle seems pertinent for any consideration of
using stigmatization, since the use of stigmatization is
associated with harmful effects, but there is uncertainty
about the size of these.
We believe that the uncertainty of the effectiveness
and of the costs to the individual of using stigmatization
to promote public health, in combination with the con-
siderations related to state-sanctioned paternalism and
the challenges to human dignity, represent a strong case
for considering stigmatization as an ethically illegitimate
instrument of public health interventions.
Often, however, stigmatization is not the primary
means by which a public health intervention works,
but rather a desired or undesired side effect. Here the
analysis becomes more complicated, since there will be
cases where reliable empirical knowledge points to
very significant benefits of the intervention that are likely
to outweigh any harm caused by the stigmatization.
Such an intervention would thus fulfil the maximisation
criterion.
In the following we would like to deepen the analysis
by considering a particular case where the public health
authorities are faced with choosing between different
public health policies to combat a threat to public
health in a context where one or more groups of people
will be stigmatized given the prevalent public attitudes
towards the problem in question.
The case of MRSA in Denmark
Multiresistant bacteria
Multi-resistant bacteria are a growing problem around
the world. The World Health Organization defines anti-
microbial resistance as “resistance of a microorganism to
an antimicrobial drug that was originally effective for
treatment of infections caused by it” [22]. The seriousness
of the issue has been placed in perspective by the British
Government’s chief medical officer, Professor Dame Sally
Davies, who talks of the growing resistance to antibiotics
as a ticking time bomb. She furthermore states that the
problem should be “ranked along with terrorism on a list
of threats to the nation” [23].
The development of resistance to antibiotics in bac-
teria is a naturally occurring evolutionary mechanism,
which benefits the different bacteria such that the
individual strains become immune to the antibiotics
used against them. However, according to WHO, this
development is accelerating, thus rendering existing
antibiotics useless against the new strains of bacteria
that are developing in response to widespread and in-
creased human use of antibiotics [22].
Antibiotics are used against a wide variety of micro-
bial infections in humans ranging from life-threatening
situations in relation to e.g. prematurely born children,
surgery, and cancer, to less serious problems such as
e.g. impetigo, acne, and tonsillitis. Furthermore antibi-
otics are used for animals for a variety of reasons. The
use for companion and production animals is the most
widespread. The reasons behind the spread of multi-
resistant bacteria and the best avenues to solve or at least
mitigate the problem are therefore complex [24, 25].
MRSA in Denmark
Our case is from Denmark. It pertains to the combin-
ation of multi-resistant MRSA CC398 bacteria (known
as “Swine-MRSA” in the Danish public) from the use
of antibiotics in the Danish pig production and public
health system. In 2013 in Denmark almost 80 % of all
antibiotics used on animals were used in pig produc-
tion [26]. The number of reported cases of MRSA
CC398 in humans has likewise grown from 12 in 2007
to more than 1.000 in 2014 [27]. Since 2012, 5 deaths
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have been reported as being directly connected to the
bacteria [28].
In 2012 two journalists–by referring to the Danish
act on public access to official records-applied to see
which pig farms had been tested positive with regard to
MRSA CC398. The Danish Veterinary and Food Ad-
ministration rejected this request, as it would–among
other things–allegedly place the affected farmers at risk
of being socially stigmatized. The case is complicated
from a legal point of view, since the two journalists
simultaniously acquired the information through an an-
onymous source, and subsequently published the data.
This resulted in them being convicted with reference to
the law protecting personal data. Later the Danish
‘Ombudsmand’ ruled that the interest of the public out-
weighed the risk for the affected farmers and the
Danish Veterinary and Food Administration were told
to grant access to the information. This decision has
then been appealed by the Danish Agriculture and Food
Council that represents the producers [29]. As can be
readily seen the legal side of the case is more than com-
plicated. Our focus is, however, on an ethical analysis of
the values embedded in the question of stigmatization in
relation to MRSA CC398, and whether not making the in-
formation publically available does not also carry the risk
of stigmatizing certain citizens.
The ethics of MRSA interventions–the choice of whom to
stigmatize
The scenarios
As mentioned above, one of the reasons for not publishing
information on which farms are infected by MRSA CC398
has been the fear of stigmatizing the farmer and people in-
volved in the production (family, employees etc.) to avoid
risks of harming them socially and economically.
Based on the effects of providing the public with know-
ledge about the infected farms, four scenarios may be
distinguished. The first is where public knowledge about
which farms are infected actually increases public health
by reducing the number of persons who get infected [1].
The second is where the knowledge does not change pub-
lic health [2]. Since people related to farms allegedly may
come to experience stigmatization as a result of the public
knowledge of the MRSA CC398, scenario 1 and 2 may be
further divided based on the occurrence of stigmatization
(S) or no stigmatization (N). We thus end up with the
following matrix (Table 1):
From a utility perspective the key scenario is 1S
where the public health benefits must be weighed
against the harm suffered by the stigmatized farmers.
This scenario is evidently controversial as seen from an
autonomy and dignity perspective. Also it may be con-
troversial from a utility perspective, depending on the
size of the public health gain. On the other hand, sce-
nario 1N is uncontroversial from all perspectives since
there are public health benefits to be gained and no
stigmatization. Both scenarios 2S and 2N hold no gain
in public health and therefore cannot be justified within
a utility perspective narrowly focused on public health.
Scenario 2S–contrary to 2N–involves stigmatization
and therefore runs counter to protection of autonomy
and dignity.
In light of this preliminary analysis, we shall focus on
the justifiability of scenario 1S. Note firstly that it can-
not be justified within a utility perspective that trades on
optimization, since the farmers that suffer stigmatization
do not gain the direct health benefits. We here assume
that they already know about the infection and therefore
must be assumed to exhibit behavior in terms of their
health that is not likely to change because of the dissemin-
ation of the relevant information. They are thus made
worse off by the stigmatization ensuing from the dissem-
ination of the relevant information. There may, hypothet-
ically, be other long term benefits for the farmers if
disclosure leads to increased health care support for them
personally, but such benefits are uncertain and it is an
open question whether or not they would outweigh the
costs associated with having been stigmatized. Thus the
real question concerns whether scenario 1S may be justi-
fied from a utility maximizing perspective. In order to
decide this we must address the main assumptions of this
scenario, which are that the act of making information
on infected farms publicly available will ensue in
stigmatization of the farmers, but also that it will be
associated with improvements to public health. There
is some evidence in favor of both of these assumptions.
The potential effects of being stigmatized in general
have been described above in relation to HIV/AIDS and
psychiatric disorders. Similar effects must be expected in
people infected with MRSA CC398. A Swedish study
from 2009, based on qualitative interviews with 13
MRSA (not MRSA CC398) patients, uncovered that the
patients shared experiences of feeling “invaded, insecure,
and alone” because of the infection. Common findings
were guilt and shame in relation to close relatives. Some
spoke of social withdrawal, work-related problems, fear
and experiences of social isolation etc. [30]. These findings
are compatible with stigmatization having taken place, but
since there are also other possible explanations they are
not absolutely conclusive. However, stories and interviews
in the Danish media with MRSA CC398 infected persons
Table 1 Public Health Benefits and Stigmatization
Knowledge-> Stigmatization No Stigmatization
Public Health Benefits 1S 1N
No Public Health Benefits 2S 2N
Ploug et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:640 Page 5 of 10
seem to indicate that stigmatization is taking place.
One former production leader from a pig production
facility reports that his experiences with the health care
system in relation to a knee operation and the birth of
his child made him feel like a leper, because of the
different precautions that had to be taken to avoid him
or his girlfriend passing on the infection [31]. There are
also reports of families feeling stigmatized and socially
excluded from local communities, even refusals to
shake hands. Stories like these are not necessarily rep-
resentative, but there is no doubt that they reinforce
the experience of stigmatization in others who are
infected. There is thus little doubt that being infected
with MRSA CC398 can lead to an experience of
stigmatization. In the Danish media there has also been
discussions about the ethical/causal responsibility of
the farming sector as a whole for producing multi-
resistance. In these discussions the responsibility has
primarily been seen as sector-wide, and not individua-
lised in relation to the farmers. It is worth noting, that
being infected with MRSA CC398 does not necessarily
lead to stigmatization. One can imagine a situation
where the Danish public is supportive of the infected
people instead. This is, however, not the picture that
can be drawn from the media coverage in Denmark of
the issue.
The gain in public health following public availability
of information on infected farms may be achieved in at
least two ways. Firstly, it may follow from increased
efforts from farmers to combat the infection in order to
avoid stigmatization. Secondly, it may follow from the
ability to avoid sources of infection through the awareness
of these.
In terms of the former, we have previously reported
the results of two studies indicating that stigmatization
of smokers or increase in the social unacceptability of
smoking would be effective in decreasing smoking rates
[5, 6]. Although there are significant differences be-
tween combatting smoking and MRSA infected farms,
one could argue that the stigmatization of farmers
basically creates an incentive for changing a state of
affairs that may be changed by the efforts of the farmer.
MRSA–like smoking–is to some extent under the influ-
ence and control of the farmer.
In terms of health benefits related to a general aware-
ness of specific infection sources, the case is slightly
more complex. According to Danish health authorities
the risk of being infected with MRSA CC398 when
working in an infected pig production facility is signifi-
cant. There is also a significant, albeit smaller risk of
passing the infection on to close contacts such as part-
ners and children. The risk of catching the infection by
an everyday encounter with an infected person or by
visiting a pig production facility is, however, considered
to be insignificant [32, 33]. That it is possible to catch
MRSA 398 without working in the pig industry is,
however, evident, as at least 4 of the 5 deaths ascribed
so far to MRSA CC398 in Denmark involve people
external to a pig production facility [34]. The general
conclusion seems to be that if workers are not informed
that they work at an MRSA facility, there is a significant
risk that they will carry it home to their relatives that again
might carry it on in their line of work. Thus, the health
benefit is linked to awareness–not of the public in
general–but of the farmer and employees at farms. The
general public will only gain few health benefits from
knowing that the pigs of pig producer A have MRSA.
Although there is some evidence of both the stigma-
tizing effect and some public health benefits following
the public availability of information on MRSA infected
farms, we believe the evidence to be insufficient for mak-
ing any definite conclusions. In any case, if public know-
ledge about infected farms should result in stigmatization,
we shall, in accordance with our previous analysis of the
general issue of using or allowing stigmatization for public
health purposes, defend the stance based on the autonomy
and dignity perspective, i.e. that stigmatization cannot be
considered a legitimate instrument to promote public
health. This conclusion does not, however, take into ac-
count a very important, but easily overlooked, feature of
the discussion of using or allowing stigmatization for
public health purposes.
The stigmatization dilemma
So far we have considered the ethics of using measures
to prevent the spread of disease that may result in
stigmatization of a group of people. Having acknowledged
the ethical relevance of stigmatization, the argument is,
however, still too simple. Often the choice to be made in
the public health context is not between stigmatization
and no stigmatization, but rather between who or
which group of people to stigmatize. That is, public
health intervention is in effect faced with a choice be-
tween an intervention that will stigmatize one group
and an intervention or a non-intervention that will
stigmatize another group or several other groups. If this
is the case, it is not clear, as we will argue, who has the
right not to or deserves the most not to be stigmatized.
The MRSA case given above illustrates this well.
In the current situation, some people are already in-
fected with MRSA CC398 and may as a consequence
suffer stigmatization when identified; those patients,
irrespective of whether they are somehow related to the
pig-industry or not, are treated in a special way in the
Danish health sector to avoid spreading the infection. It
is clearly stated in the guidelines from the Danish
health authorities that all citizens-irrespective of their
MRSA status-are entitled to the same care from the
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public health sector [32]. They are, however, encouraged-
as long as they are considered carriers of the bacteria-
to inform all health personnel they come into contact
with that they have been tested positive and are issued
with a small ID-card containing this information.
Besides being asked to do this the health authorities
recommend that everybody in the household are treated
as carriers of MRSA, undergo an eradication treatment,
and are tested for MRSA afterwards. Furthermore the
patient is instructed to thoroughly clean his or her home,
being given specific guidelines for how to go about this.
Stigmatization following the diagnosis of MRSA is
related to several of the directives from the Danish
health authorities. First, there is the identification of a
difference between carriers and non-carriers and the la-
beling that is related to the diagnosis in itself, but also-
and not least-the requirement of carrying identification
as being MRSA infected. This implies that the patient is
seen as a threat to public health and may readily lead to
the patient seeing him or herself as such. Secondly, pro-
viding the information that MRSA patients carry equal
rights to treatment, but in the same breath encouraging
them to identify themselves as carriers of MRSA, would
seem to have two implications; it may enhance the
experience of stigmatization although it is aimed at re-
assuring the patients, but it can also be read as suggest-
ing a conditional right to treatment based on the extent
to which one poses a threat to the health of others or
conditional on the extent to which one identifies oneself
as a carrier of MRSA in interactions with the health care
system. Both of these interpretations may result in a
stronger experience of stigmatization. The carriers of
MRSA are thus treated differently than most other pa-
tients in the healthcare system, e.g. by being required to
carry ID. Thus, if the information provided to the pa-
tients and the recommendations issued subsequently
have the implications discussed above, it seems reason-
able for the patient to fear discrimination. Thirdly, the
fact that the whole of the family is to undergo an eradica-
tion treatment and their house is to be cleaned in a spe-
cific way widens the social implications of contracting
MRSA. The threat from MRSA does not only come from
a particular person, but the family and household of that
person. It seems that this is likely to increase the social
costs of carrying MRSA, not least for children and
youths–at least for a period of time. Their social status
can be affected negatively to the extent this becomes
known or to the extent the requirement to keep it a se-
cret, affects the children. Thus, stigmatization and self-
stigmatization are both possibilities here.
It should be noted that all of these discriminatory ef-
fects must be expected to increase with a growing num-
ber of people contracting MRSA. As mentioned above:
more than 1.000 people have been diagnosed as carriers
of MRSA CC398 in 2014 in Denmark. It is also worth
noting that there is evidence that an MRSA diagnosis can
cause psychological and social problems for those who
experience it [35]. Also, the harm to the individual caused
by stigmatization can be a result of actual stigmatization
in the public sphere or related to the individual perceiving
stigmatization, whether this actually takes place or not.
What we are arguing here is that the precautionary mea-
sures dictated by the Danish health authorities are likely
to accommodate this latter kind of stigmatization where
the individual is not stigmatized “officially”, but nonethe-
less experiences being stigmatized. As already mentioned,
it is very clear in the guidelines from the authorities
that there is to be no difference in the care offered to
carriers and non-carriers. Note finally, that we do not–
so far–suggest that the Danish authorities’ precaution-
ary measures are in any respect wrong, but only that
may lead to stigmatization/the feeling of being stigma-
tized among the group of people carrying MRSA.
The pig producers in general may also experience
stigmatization. Thus, not making public which farms are
infected and which are not, carries the risk of stigmatizing
even the pig producers who do not have MRSA CC398.
This illustrates that merely identifying a public health
problem, e.g. “there is a MRSA problem in Danish pig
production”, may have some stigmatizing effect. The level
of this concern is obviously related to the number of
infected/non-infected farms, but as mentioned above
there is a growing numbers of reports showing that many
pig producers experience social stigmatization even though
it is not clear whether they are infected or not [31, 36].
If public health interventions may–as substantiated in
this section–have unintentionally stigmatizing effects on
different groups, the question of the legitimacy of using
such measures in public health interventions becomes
more complex. A particularly complex situation arises if
it is possible to avoid the stigmatization of one group–or
partly avoid or diminish it–by using measures that will
inevitably lead to the stigmatization of another group. In
that case we are faced with a stigmatization dilemma.
The MRSA case could be argued to represent such a
dilemma. As we have seen there is some ground for
believing that by making information on MRSA infected
farms publicly available there are potential gains in
public health, but at the cost of the farmers suffering
stigmatization. Failure to make the information publicly
available may result in more citizens contracting MRSA
and consequently suffering stigmatization. Add to this
the stigmatization that may be suffered by farmers on
non-infected farms, and it is clear that public health
interventions in this field are likely to be faced with a
stigmatization dilemma. We have previously argued and
maintained that stigmatization must be avoided, if at all
possible. However, when facing a stigmatization dilemma
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the question is no longer if it is legitimate for public health
interventions to employ stigmatizing measures, but rather
whom public health interventions would be most justified
in stigmatizing.
In clonclusion it seems that stigmatization dilemmas
are likely to occur in relation to surveillance and pre-
vention of infectious diseases because it is difficult to
communicate effectively about infectious threats to the
public health without running the risk of associating
those who are infected with negative stereotypes.
The ethics of “choosing” whom to stigmatize
The stigmatization dilemma arising in the case of
MRSA in Denmark reinvigorates the debate on the eth-
ical difference between acts and omissions. One way to
address the issue would thus be to let this distinction
be decisive for the choice between the horns of the
dilemma. A defender of this distinction would claim
that it is worse to intentionally act in ways that bring
about a certain negative outcome than to intentionally
omit actions with the same outcome. In the MRSA case
the Danish health authorities may intervene in ways
that directly result in the stigmatization of farmers and
others, e.g. by making information on infected farms
publicly available, but the failure to intervene may also
result in stigmatization, e.g. of the infected citizens. In
light of the MRSA case this could be taken to imply
that it must be considered a worse act by the health au-
thorities to impose stigmatization on the farmers as the
aim of a public health intervention than to omit such
actions with the stigmatization of citizens as a result. In
both situations stigmatization of a group of people is
the outcome, but in the former case it is the outcome
of an act, in the latter case it is the outcome of an omis-
sion. Note that the negative outcome of act and omission
is the same in light of an underlying value-theory that de-
fines stigmatization as wrong per se. The defender of this
view would thus have to base it on considerations that
entail the wrongfulness of stigmatization as such, e.g. con-
siderations from within the autonomy or dignity perspec-
tive, and would also have to reject considerations from
within the utility perspective since they may ultimately
lead to the rejection of the distinction between acts and
omissions.
Alternatively one could argue that the distinction be-
tween acts and omissions cannot be upheld–at least not
in certain cases. This view would correspond with an
underlying value theory that credits considerations from
within the utility, autonomy, as well as the dignity per-
spective in that it upholds the unacceptability of
stigmatization as such, but allows for considerations of
utility to override autonomy and dignity considerations
in certain cases. The cardinal question then becomes
what features a situation should exhibit in order to make
a choice of intervention involving stigmatization justified?
A situation characterized by a stigmatization dilemma
could be claimed to be such a case.
Thus, the proviso on any form of active use of health
interventions knowingly resulting in the stigmatization
of groups of people would be that it is the outcome of a
choice between different courses of actions and omissions
that all imply the stigmatization of a group of people. It
must be a choice between whom to stigmatize. Note that
this covers situations in which the stigmatization on one
horn of the dilemma is not directly or indirectly related to
the public health intervention, but may result from failing
to act. Thus, it includes situations where the failure to
make a public health intervention with stigmatizing effects
will result in foreseeable informal, non-institutionalized
stigmatization of a group of people. A failure to make a
public health intervention with stigmatizing effects di-
rected at people with e.g. leprosy could result in increased
socially driven stigmatization. Second, it seems evident
that stigmatization can only be legitimately used where
it is likely to have an effect on public health. Any at-
tempt of improving public health by means involving
the stigmatization of people must happen on the basis
of evidence for the positive effect on public health of
the interventions involving stigmatization [9]. Thirdly,
it must be possible to escape stigmatization. That is, it
must be possible for the group of people suffering
stigmatization to change the aspect of their situation
that triggers the stigmatization. In other words, it must
be possible to obtain the public health benefit without
permanently placing people in a stigmatized position.
Relatedly, any intervention resulting in stigmatization
should employ means that stigmatizes as few as pos-
sible, as briefly as possible, and as little as possible.
A special case may obtain when the public health inter-
vention is faced with a stigmatization dilemma, where one
of the groups threatened by stigmatization by health au-
thorities is stigmatized already. This may in itself provide
a reason not further to stigmatize this group [37].
Summary
It is uncontroversial to claim that some public health
interventions cause particular groups and individuals to
become stigmatized, and that this stigmatization may
be harmful psychologically, or because it leads to harm-
ful discrimination. The stigmatization may either be a
deliberately chosen means to achieve a positive public
health outcome, or it may be an intended or unin-
tended side effect of a public health intervention where
the positive outcome is not solely dependent on the
stigmatizing effect.
In this paper we have argued that using stigmatization
as a direct means to achieve public health outcomes is
almost always ethically illegitimate. Autonomy and dignity
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considerations count against it, and the cost-benefit ana-
lysis that might by some be taken to outweigh these con-
siderations will be fundamentally uncertain.
We have further argued that interventions where
stigmatization is a side-effect need to fulfil require-
ments of proportionality, and that they may fall prey to
‘the stigmatization dilemma’, i.e. the dilemma that arises
when all policy options are potentially stigmatizing but
to different groups. When such a dilemma arises the
decision-maker should choose the intervention that
does not lead to permanent stigmatization and that
stigmatizes as few as possible, as briefly as possible, and
as little as possible.
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